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Abstract
We reverse engineer dynamics of financial contagion to find the scenario of smallest
exogenous shock that, should it occur, would lead to a given final systemic loss. This
reverse stress test can be used to identify the potential triggers of systemic events,
and it removes the arbitrariness in the selection of shock scenarios in stress testing.
We consider in particular the case of distress propagation in an interbank market, and
we study a network of 44 European banks, which we reconstruct using data collected
from Bloomberg. By looking at the distribution across banks of the size of smallest
exogenous shocks we rank banks in terms of their systemic importance, and we show the
effectiveness of a policy with capital requirements based on this ranking. We also study
the properties of smallest exogenous shocks as a function of the largest eigenvalue λmax
of the matrix of interbank leverages, which determines the endogenous amplification
of shocks. We find that the size of smallest exogenous shocks reduces and that the
distribution across banks becomes more localized as λmax increases.
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1 Introduction
Systemic risk – the risk associated with the occurrence of a catastrophic breakdown of
the financial system – arises endogenously from interactions between the participants that
operate in financial markets. Because some types of interactions between financial institu-
tions (in the following banks for brevity) can be modeled in terms of dynamical processes
on networks, a growing body of literature has focused on the study of contagion and dis-
tress propagation in financial networks [1–3]. This research began in the year 2000 with
the work of Allen and Gale, who showed that the topology of financial networks influ-
ences financial contagion [4]. Many different algorithms have since then been developed
to model the propagation of distress between banks under different assumptions as well as
to study the relation between the structure of a financial network and its stability (see for
instance [3,5–21]). In this respect, significant progress has been made in the identification
of the main drivers of financial contagion and in the design of new stress test frameworks
that, at odds with standard micro-prudential tools, do account for interactions between
banks [13,21–26].
While the focus of research carried out so far has been mainly that of developing
models to understand how exogenous shock are amplified by the endogenous dynamics
of the system, here we look at the reverse problem. We compute the time trajectories of
smallest shocks that need to affect banks to produce a final loss of equity larger than a given
threshold, which we therefore refer to as worst case shocks. The solution of this reverse
problem is useful to identify stress scenarios whose occurrence would lead to systemic
events, thus identifying the vulnerabilities of a financial system.
At the level of individual institutions, reverse stress testing is a regulatory requirement
in the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union. The Financial Services Authority,
one of the UK’s financial regulators, describes it as a complementary exercise to general
stress and scenario testing. In standard stress testing a forward-looking methodology
is employed, in which scenarios are selected to predict their potential impact upon the
financial health of banks. Reverse stress testing on the other hand looks backward by
identifying the scenarios that cause a specific loss to a bank. This way of identifying
stress scenarios is the major advantage of reverse stress testing. Instead of relying on the
judgement of experts to select scenarios, the most dangerous scenarios are automatically
identified.
Previous work in this area has focused on developing reverse stress testing frameworks
that are intended to be used for the risk analyses of individual institutions rather than of
the financial system as a whole [27]. Some studies are dedicated to optimizing scenario se-
lection, and defining probability distributions of the numerous intertwined driving variables
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across asset classes. For two recent reviews see [3, 28] and for a mathematical approach
to worst case scenario selection see [29]. However, we were not able to find any previous
research on reverse stress testing in interbank networks that investigates systemic risk.
In this paper we present as a case study a reverse stress test analysis of a system
composed of the 44 European banks that are the constituents of the STOXX Europe 600
Banks index. This index is the major equity benchmark of the most significant financial
institutions in Europe. For each bank we collected from Bloomberg data on total interbank
lending, total interbank borrowing and Tier 1 equity capital. We used the RAS algorithm
[30] to reconstruct the matrix of interbank exposures. We then computed the worst case
shocks under a linear model of distress propagation, the so-called DebtRank [13]. We
chose this contagion algorithm because of its simplicity and because it can be considered
a first-order approximation for a more generic class of contagion algorithms [31,32].
Our main results are the following:
• we show that as the largest eigenvalue of the matrix of interbank leverages increases
the worst case shocks become smaller and concentrated in a smaller set of banks;
• we compute the distribution across banks of worst case shock sizes, thus providing a
ranking of banks in terms of their systemic importance;
• we show that the obtained ranking can be used to make the system more robust
through the implementation of targeted capital requirement policies.
Beyond the specific results we obtain, we regard as the main contribution of the paper
that of employing contagion algorithms to reverse engineer contagion dynamics in complex
systems. This approach is inspired by (network) control theory, which is a methodology
from engineering recently applied to complex systems [33]. In control theory the goal is to
drive a system (in our case a network representing interbank lending between banks) from
an initial state to a desired target state (in our case to a minimum level of financial losses)
with the least effort (in our case exogenous shocks to the balance sheets of banks).
2 Problem set-up
We consider a system of N banks that interact through a network of mutual exposures
(interbank assets and liabilities), and we consider a dynamical setting in which the equity
of banks is updated in discrete time-steps. We assume that a bank holds in its portfolio
external assets (external to the banking system we are modeling) in addition to interbank
assets.
In the following we consider a discrete time dynamic for the value of banks’ portfolios,
and we denote by Aij(t) the value of the exposure of bank i to bank j at time t, by Ei(t)
the equity of bank i at time t, by Aexti (t) the value of external (i.e. non interbank) assets of
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bank i at time t, and finally by Li the liabilities of bank i, that we assume to be constant
over time. A further assumption is that banks do not rebalance their portfolio (i.e. the
number of shares they own of an asset is assumed to be constant), so that the changes in
the balance sheet of a bank are only due to changes in the price of the bank’s assets.
From the balance-sheet identity we have that
Ei(t) =
∑
j
Aij(t) +A
ext
i (t)− Li. (1)
We now consider a situation in which the value of external assets is subject to random
market fluctuations, while the value of the interbank assets of a bank at time t depends on
the equity of its counterparties at time t−1. Following [13,21] we assume that the relative
devaluation of an interbank asset is proportional to the relative devaluation of the equity
of the counterparty:
Aij(t)−Aij(0)
Aij(0)
= β
Ej(t− 1)− Ej(0)
Ej(0)
, (2)
where β is a positive constant. Therefore the equity of bank i evolves in discrete time
according to
Ei(t) = β
∑
j
Aij(0)Ej(t− 1)
Ej(0)
+Aexti (t)− Li. (3)
Following [21] we now define hi(t) =
Ei(0)−Ei(t)
Ei(0)
and Λij =
Aij(0)
Ei(0)
, so that
hi(t) = β
∑
j
Λijhj(t− 1) + A
ext
i (0)−Aexti (t)
Ei(0)
. (4)
The quantity Λij represents the importance for bank i of its interbank asset associated
with bank j, as measured in terms of i’s equity. In particular, if the value of the interbank
asset drops by 1%, bank i would experience a loss of Λij% of its equity. For this reason,
Λij is referred to as the matrix of interbank leverages [21].
We now further define ui(t) =
Aexti (0)−Aexti (t)
Ei(0)
, which represents the contribution to the
relative equity loss of bank i due to shocks to its external assets between times 0 and t, so
that
hi(t) =
∑
j
Λijhj(t− 1) + ui(t). (5)
We now imagine a situation in which we want to reverse stress test the system over a
time horizon T . In particular, we assume to be at time t = 0 and we look for trajectories
of shocks {~u(1), ~u(2), . . . , ~u(T )} to external assets that can lead at time T to losses equal
or greater than a given threshold, i.e. such that
hi(T ) =
T∑
t=1
βT−t
(
ΛT−t
)
ij
uj(t) ≥ `i, (6)
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with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and where we have denoted by `i the threshold associated with the
loss of bank i. There are clearly many possible trajectories that satisfy the constraints (6);
here we are interested in identifying those that minimize fluctuations of relative losses on
external assets over time, i.e. for which the following quantity is minimized:
K ≡
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(ui(t)− ui(t− 1))2 (7)
The cost function K can be interpreted as the aggregate size of the exogenous shock
affecting the system (note that here we do not make a distinction between positive or
negative shocks).
In summary, we are interested in solving the following optimization problem
min
(
1
2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∆ui(t)
2
)
, (8)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
βT−t
(
ΛT−t
)
ij
uj(t) ≥ `i, ∀i.
where we have defined ∆ui(t) = ui(t) − ui(t − 1) and assumed ui(0) = 0 for all i. ∆ui(t)
represents the loss due to shocks on external assets experienced by bank i between times
t − 1 and t. The optimization problem can be more conveniently written in terms of the
only variables ∆u’s as
min
(
1
2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∆ui(t)
2
)
, (9)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
βT−t
t∑
s=1
(
ΛT−t
)
ij
∆uj(s) ≥ `i, ∀i.
3 Homogeneous system
In order to develop an intuition on the behavior of the solutions of (9), we first consider the
simple case of a homogeneous system in which all banks have the same interbank leverage
c, i.e. the matrix Λ is such that
∑
j Λij = c for all i. In this case, the optimization problem
reduces to
min
(
1
2
T∑
t=1
∆u(t)2
)
, (10)
s.t.
T∑
s=1
T∑
t=s
λT−t∆u(s) ≥ `,
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where we have defined λ = βc.
This problem can be easily solved with the method of Lagrange multipliers, which
brings
∆u(t) =
∑T
r=t λ
T−r∑T
s=1
(∑T
r=s λ
T−r
)2 ` (11)
and
K =
`2∑T
s=1
(∑T
t=s λ
T−t
)2 (12)
=
(λ− 1)3(λ+ 1)`2
T (λ2 − 1) + λ (λT − 1) (λT+1 − λ− 2) . (13)
From this formula we see that, upon increasing the time horizon T over which stress prop-
agates, the size of exogenous shocks needed to produce the sought final loss progressively
reduces and goes to zero in the limit T →∞. This is expected, as shocks can reverberate
over a longer time horizon, and eventually an infinite sequence of infinitesimal shocks can
lead to the final loss `.
However the behavior of the cost function for long time horizons shows the existence
of two very distinct regimes: If λ > 1 the cost function approaches zero exponentially
as K ∼ λ−2T `2, while if λ < 1 the cost function decays to zero much more slowly, as
K ∼ `2(λ−1)2T . The reason of this behavior is that for λ > 1 shocks are exponentially
amplified by the dynamics.
A similar behavior can be observed for a general matrix of interbank leverages, where
the largest eigenvalue λmax of βΛ now discriminates between the two regimes. We discuss
this case in the following section.
4 Case study
We discuss an empirical application of the optimization problem (9) to an interbank system
representing the largest banks in Europe. We explore the results of this problem of reverse
engineering financial contagion as a function of the following variables:
1. The largest eigenvalue λmax of the matrix of interbank leverages, which determines
the stability of the dynamics [34]. For simplicity of notation, we refer to λmax as the
largest eigenvalue of the matrix βΛ.
2. The minimal financial loss `i, which is the target state of the optimized dynamics;
3. The time horizon T .
We further define the quantity Ki =
∑
t ∆ui(t)
2, which expresses the size of the exoge-
nous shock experienced by bank i over the time horizon T .
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4.1 Data
From Bloomberg we collected data of the 44 banks belonging to the STOXX Europe 600
Banks index, ticker symbol: SX7P. In particular, for each bank we collected information
on its equity, total interbank assets (advances and loans to banks) and total interbank
liabilities (deposits due to other banks) for the entire year of 2015. We then used the
RAS algorithm to reconstruct a matrix of interbank liabilities to represent an interbank
lending network. Starting from total interbank assets and liabilities of each bank, the RAS
algorithm allows an allocation of interbank loans across counterparties [30]. If no further
constraints are added, the outcome of the RAS algorithm is a complete weighted network
of interbank claims. Although real interbank networks are far from complete [35–38], here
for simplicity we focus on this limiting case which allows us to focus on the mechanics
of reverse stress testing only, rather than on the interplay between network topology and
contagion.
4.2 Aggregate properties of work-case shocks
Figure 1 shows the behavior of the cost function K as a function of λmax for different
time horizons and for `i = 0.1 for all i. It can be seen that the size of exogenous shocks
decreases as a function of λmax across all T . As λmax increases the endogenous dynamics
of the network lead to a larger amplification of the distress, such that a lower magnitude
of external shocks is required to reach the target loss `i.
For a similar reason larger T result in smaller K independently of λmax. The endogenous
network dynamics propogate the distress of the previous time step, thereby implying a lower
external shock requirement as T is increased. Because the iteration map (5) does not reach
a fixed point if λmax > 1, even in the absence of external shocks beyond the first time step
(i.e. u(t) = 0 for any t > 1), we expect the size of the exongeonous shocks K to go towards
zero exponentially fast in the limit T →∞. This is indeed the case, as shown in the inset
of fig. 1.
The behavior is qualitatively similar for any value of final losses `, as we show in fig. 2,
where we plot the cost function K as a function of λmax and ` for T = 20. From this figure
we see that when λmax is large enough the shock needed to cause the sought final losses is
relatively independent of `, while it increases with ` when λmax < 1.
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Figure 1: Size of shocks as a function of λmax for various control times T . Inset: K as a
function of T for λmax = 1.5. When λmax > 1 shocks decay exponentially fast with T .
Figure 2: Size of shocks as a function of the target losses `i = ` and λmax. For large λmax
the cost function is independent of the final loss.
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4.3 Concentration of risk
We have so far looked at the aggregate properties of worst case shocks, however the method-
ology we propose allows to obtain the distribution of shocks across banks in the system.
This information is useful as it enables us to rank banks in terms of their contribution to
the aggregate shock, and to identify potential concentrations of vulnerability in the system:
If the worst case aggregate shock is uniformly distributed across all banks, then we would
expect the system to be more resilient with respect to idiosyncratic failures of individual
banks (although the system might be vulnerable with respect to common factors affecting
banks portfolios); if the shock is instead highly concentrated in a few banks, the system is
vulnerable with respect to the failure of those banks [39].
Figure 3: Distribution across nodes of the size of standardized shocks for different values of
λmax. s is the standard deviation and µ the mean of the respective distributions. As λmax
increases shocks become more concentrated.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of standardized shocks size across the banks in the
system for three different values of λmax: 0.5, 1, and 1.5. As it can be seen from the figure,
the distribution of shocks are strongly affected by λmax. In particular, we observe that
shocks appear to become more concentrated for higher values of λmax.
This concentration of systemic risk can be quantified by computing the inverse partic-
ipation ratio (IPR), defined as
IPR =
1∑n
i=1 p
2
i
, (14)
where pi =
Ki
K for each node i. The IPR has a lower bound of 1 when the shock is
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concentrated in one node, and an upper bound of n when the shock is equally spread
across all nodes.
As it can be seen in fig. 4 the IPR is unaffected by `, it decreases significantly as λmax
approaches 1, and it becomes constant for λmax > 1. A dip of the IPR can be seen in
fig. 4. The reason for this behavior is not clear. A possible intuitive explanation is the
following: Upon increasing λmax the endogenous amplification of shocks gets stronger, and
nodes find it easier to achieve their target losses within the time horizon T . Eventually
for λmax large enough most of the nodes can reach their target merely due to endogenous
amplification. However, the value of λmax needed for this to occur might be different from
bank to bank. This is because the dynamics take place over a finite time horizon T and
because of the heterogeneity of banks. On this basis we would expect the dip to disappear
for large enough T . This is in fact the case, as we show in fig. 5, where we plot the IPR
for different values of T .
Figure 4: Inverse participation ratio (IPR) as a function of the target state `i and λmax.
Worst case shocks become more concentrated as λmax increases.
We have seen that increasing λmax leads to a reduction of the aggregate size of the
shock K needed to drive the system towards a certain loss and to a concentration of shocks
upon a smaller set of banks. We stress here that these two behaviors have different roots.
The reduction of K is due to the fact that the system becomes more unstable as leverage
increases. The concentration of risk is due to the heterogeneity of leverage across banks. In
fact, in the homogeneous system considered in section 3 this concentration does not occur.
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Figure 5: Inverse participation ratio (IPR) as a function of λmax for various control times
T . The IPR dip does not occur for T ≥ 75.
4.4 A simple policy experiment
The trajectories of worst case shocks we have computed correspond to the least extreme
scenario that leads to a prescribed final loss equal or greater than `. In this sense, the
concentration of shocks discussed above suggests that there is a regime (high λmax) where
systemic vulnerabilities can be associated with a small set of banks, those where the ag-
gregate shock is concentrated.
To show that this is the case we run the dynamics (5) forward applying the worst case
shocks to a subset of the nodes. We then compute the final loss observed in the system
divided by the final loss observed when all banks are stressed and plot this ratio as a
function of the fraction of stressed banks.
Figure 6 shows the result of this experiment for different values of λmax when the
stressed banks are those with the highest values of Ki. We also report the results for the
benchmark case in which stressed banks are randomly selected. As expected, deviations
from the benchmark case become larger as the system becomes more unstable. The concen-
tration of systemic risk in the system can be seen particularly when λmax = 1.5 (black line),
in which case the exogenous shock of five banks can lead to roughly 70% of all observed
final losses. Note that when banks are randomly selected then no such concentration is
observed (stars in equivalent colors in the figure).
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Figure 6: Incremental addition of u(t) to banks in a decreasing order of the size of their
individual shocks for various λmax. The stars represent the average across 500 simulations
in which banks were randomly selected (same colors as for the three lines corresponding to
the three different λmax shown in the legend). For λmax = 1.5 the shock on the first ten
banks already accounts for 50% of final losses.
These insights can be used for a policy experiment on the equity requirements of indi-
vidual banks, that aims to reduce the observed financial losses under the scenario identified
through the reverse stress test. In fact the contribution of each bank to the aggregate shock
can be used to rank banks in terms of their systemic impact.
The results of a policy exercise in which capital is allocated depending on this ranking
are shown in fig. 7. Specifically, we consider a situation in which we increase the total
capital in the system by 5% and a policy by which such capital is spread across banks
proportionally to the size of the shock computed from the reverse stress test, i.e. bank i
receives a proportion Ki/K of the total additional capital. We then compare this policy
with a benchmark according to which the equity of each bank is increased by 5%. This
benchmark mimics the case of a homogeneous (relative) increase in the capital requirement
of banks. For both policies, we compute the total relative losses R =
∑n
i hi(T ) under the
scenario identified through the reverse stress test and compare it with the total losses
observed in absence of policy intervention R0.
As it can be seen in fig. 7 when λmax < 1 the two policies achieve a similar reduction
of total losses, while the second policy becomes more effective when λmax > 1. The reason
for this result is that the explosive dynamics when λmax > 1 lead to a concentration of
systemic risk in a few banks on which an effective policy should concentrate.
As it can be seen in fig. 8 a larger increase in the sum to be allocated to the equity base
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Figure 7: Comparison of different policies to reduce the observed total financial losses. In
both cases the same amount of money was allocated in different manners to the equity of
each bank. Losses are recomputed after the equity was increased R and expressed as a
fraction of the original losses R0 on the y-axis. These results are shown as a function of
λmax along the x-axis. When λmax < 1 both policies are equally effective, however when
λmax > 1 then the policy based on the relative size of each banks’ shock Ki is significantly
more effective.
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Figure 8: Loss reduction for the policy based on our ranking as a function of λmax for
different amounts of capital injected into the system. The effectiveness of increasing capital
has rapidly vanishing returns of scale.
of each bank results in a further reduction of losses. The figure shows this for the policy
based on nodal shocks. Note however that the impact of an increased equity allocation has
decreasing returns of scale. The impact of an increase from 1% to 2% is much larger than
the impact of 4% relative to that of 5%. This behavior occurs for the benchmark policy
as well, but in that case it is not as pronounced. This is due to the fact that the policy
based on the size of shocks is much more effective in allocating the additional equity as
compared to the benchmark.
4.5 Robustness of results
We investigated the robustness of the ranking of banks based on the size of their shocks.
In order to test the robustness of rankings we changed the original equity of each bank
by a percentage randomly drawn in the range of [−0.1, 0.1]. We performed this test 100
times for each bank. Within each simulation we produced a ranking in decreasing order
of the recomputed size of the shocks for each bank. The result of these simulations are
shown in fig. 9. Specifically the figure shows the rank of each bank in a different color on
the y-axis and across all simulations along the x-axis, with the first entry along the x-axis
corresponding to the original ranking. Overall, we observe that the ranking of each bank
is relatively stable, and that banks can be clearly separated into groups, with exchange of
rankings taking place only within groups. Indeed, we observe a largest absolute change in
rank of 6 positions and an average change of rank of 0.80.
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Figure 9: Rank of each node (colour) according to a decreasing order of the size of their
individual shocks for various simulations in which the equity levels where changed by a
randomly drawn percentage in the range of [−0.1, 0.1]. The first entry along the x-axis
represents the original ranking. Banks can be robustly classified into groups on the basis
of their ranking.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a simple reverse stress testing methodology to reverse engineer distress
contagion in financial networks. We reversed the standard stress testing approach by setting
a specific outcome, the loss of a certain fraction of the equity of each bank, and looking
for the scenario with smallest shocks that could lead to such outcome over a given time
horizon.
We considered a system of interbank relationships based on 2015 annual data of the
equity, interbank lending and borrowing of the largest 44 stock exchange listed European
banks. We found that at the aggregate level the size of the worst case shock decreases as
the largest eigenvalue λmax increases, but that at the same time the shock gets concentrated
in a smaller number of banks. On the basis on this concentration of worst case shocks,
we ranked banks in terms of their systemic impact. Based on this ranking we suggested a
simple policy of capital allocations that significantly reduces the vulnerability of the system
with respect to the identified scenario in the regime of high endogenous amplification.
Our analysis can be improved in several directions: First of all, we considered a simple
linear dynamical rule of distress propagation. Although common in the literature of finan-
cial contagion, this assumption can at best be considered only an approximation of the
true dynamics. In a more general case, it is still possible to write an optimization problem
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analogous to (9) to perform the reverse stress test. The main difference with respect to the
case here considered would be the presence of a non-linear constraint, but the optimization
problem could still be solved numerically. A second limitation of our analysis is the fact
that we only considered direct long exposures between banks. Banks interact in many ways
in the real world, and a more realistic scenario would consider a multilayer description of
the network of interbank interactions. In this respect, our present analysis corresponds to
an aggregation of the multilayer structure into a single layer [40–42]. However, it would
be important to look also at the disaggregated multilayer structure because the properties
of aggregated and non-aggregated systems have been shown to differ in some cases [41].
Third, we considered the case of banks as passive investors. This is certainly a useful
benchmark, but a more realistic scenario would also account for the reaction of banks to
changing market conditions.
In spite of all the present limitations, our analysis suggests that reverse stress testing is
a useful tool for the identification of vulnerabilities at the systemic level, and we believe this
is an interesting avenue of future investigation with potentially relevant policy implications.
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